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COMMENTARY
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE JUDICIAL ROLE:
DISTINCTIONS, ROOTS, AND PROSPECTS
GERALD GUNTHER*
At most discussions of exploding rights and expanding remedies,
commentators alternate in decrying and cheering the developments of
the last quarter-century. Indeed, this remarkable series on equality in-
cludes many of those deplorers and applauders. When I read some of
the observations in the earlier papers delivered here, I was reminded of
a conference not long ago on the subject before us today, the changing
role of our courts or, as some put it, the rise of the "imperial judiciary."
There, as in some earlier sessions here, there was a preponderance of
extremes: some bemoaned the passing of the alleged halcyon era of
self-restraint and principle while others embraced the recent develop-
ments uncritically. Indeed, one distinguished academic announced
that concern with principle, restraint, legitimacy, and competence was
simply the song of "academics or losers, or both." Those exaggerated,
uncritical portrayals always bring to my mind a favorite New Yorker
cartoon. It depicts a meek-looking, bald-headed fellow driving away in
his little car-I suppose he could have been an academic or a loser, or
both. The car displays a bumper sticker with the legend "The Truth
Lies Somewhere in Between." That is precisely my reaction to most
discussions of the changing role of the federal courts.
But in airing my counsel of moderation here, I find my stance partly
preempted by Archibald Cox's thesis. Ordinarily in discussions of this
sort, to sound reasonable is to be different. In terms of my interest in
being different, I have the misfortune of being on the same program
with Archibald Cox, the quintessential reasonable man. One might
say, therefore, that it is a mistake to invite two members of the same
rare species of reasonable men to discuss the same subject. And that
limits my capacity for being distinctive to offering some micro-differ-
ences rather than macro ones.
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Stanford University. A.B., 1949, Brooklyn
College; M.A., 1950, Columbia University; LL.B., 1953, Harvard University.
Washington University Open Scholarship
818 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Let me turn to some differences in emphasis and perception, which
may distinguish me from Archibald Cox. I will articulate some distinc-
tions that seem important in thinking about the problems of the chang-
ing role of judicial institutions. I will suggest some differing
identifications of the major historical roots of our current situation.
Further, I will venture my own guesses about where we may be head-
ing.
I.
First, let me elaborate some significant distinctions too often over-
looked or blurred. The distinctions pertain to the recent trends, and to
the problems raised by those trends. The trends, as Professor Cox has
so well summarized, are those of exploding rights and expanding reme-
dies. The problems, as he has correctly raised, are those of legitimacy
and of competence.
I think we should be wary of viewing these rights-remedies-legiti-
macy-competence issues as a largely undifferentiated continuum.
Without denying their interrelation, one gains clarity by distinguishing
the expansion of rights from the problems of competence. Not every
expansion of rights generates novel, difficult problems of remedies.
Some expansions create problems primarily of competence, not legiti-
macy; some, only problems of legitimacy, not competence. In short,
not every modem growth in the role of courts presents an intertwined
rights-remedies-legitimacy-competence problem.
In my view, the problem of legitimacy is most closely associated with
the establishment of new rights, not with the development of new reme-
dies. By contrast, the problem of judicial competence-of institutional
expertise and effectiveness-is characteristically associated with reme-
dies, not rights. Moreover, legitimacy problems about rights and com-
petence problems about remedies do not typically coexist. Some newly
created rights of the most questionable legitimacy generate no remedial
difficulties at all. By contrast, some newly established rights of the
clearest legitimacy generate the most difficult questions of remedial
competence. I submit that it is rare to find a new development where
one simultaneously sees serious questions of legitimacy on the rights
side as well as serious problems of institutional competence on the re-
medial side. For me, those distinctions have some important implica-
tions, to which I will return after I give you some illustrations of the
distinctions and correlations, or lack thereof, that I have in mind.
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Note, for example, that some of the perplexing modem remedial bur-
dens on our courts stem from the most legitimate source imaginable,
the United States Congress. The proliferation of statutory rights, often
with concomitant generous grants of jurisdiction and generous al-
lowances of standing, such as in the environmental area, is a notable
modem phenomenon. When we speak of the recent explosion of
rights, we often are really thinking of legislatively created rights for
which there is no question of legitimacy, but a very grave one of com-
petence.
One can find the same lack of correlation between legitimacy-rights
problems and remedial-competence ones in constitutional law. In my
view, Brown v. Board of Education' was an entirely legitimate decision.
Similarly, I have no difficulty accepting a reading of the eighth amend-
ment that prohibits the maintenance of inhumane jails. Yet, despite
their legitimate constitutional underpinnings, the school desegregation
and jail cases have thrust the federal courts into the most difficult
spheres of remedial competence, raising all of the problems regarding
the administrative, managerial, and legislative roles of courts.
By contrast, many newly articulated constitutional rights of the most
questionable legitimacy have generated no serious remedial difficulties.
For example, I have not yet found a satisfying rationale to justify Roe v.
Wade,2 the abortion ruling, on the basis of modes of constitutional in-
terpretation I consider legitimate. Yet, the implementation of Roe v.
Wade was feasible through traditional judicial remedies by enjoining
state officials from enforcing unconstitutional abortion laws. Reynolds
i'. Sims,3 a decision in which my former employer, Earl Warren, took
more pride than any other in his career, and a decision to which Solici-
tor General Archibald Cox contributed greatly, stands as another ex-
ample of that category. Despite the questionable constitutional
underpinnings and the potential remedial problems raised by Reynolds
and reviewed by Cox, implementation of reapportionment decisions
has in most cases proved quite easy--easy, surely, in comparison with
the complexities of some school and jail and mental hospital decrees.
And so I maintain that relatively few situations simultaneously pres-
ent problems of substantive legitimacy and remedial competence. But
there are situations in which both difficulties arise and interact in sig-
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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nificant ways. Perhaps the best example is the "new" equal protection,
the venture encouraged by Warren Court dicta in the late sixties and
advanced by advocates and academics to read substantive rights and
affirmative governmental duties into the equal protection clause so as
to assure governmental provision of the necessities of life, of welfare, of
housing, of municipal services, and of education. But, as Professor
Michelman's article in this symposium demonstrated,4 that effort can
raise the gravest difficulties of legitimacy: it requires considerable de-
parture from the text, history, and structure of the Constitution to what
has recently been called "transtextual" analysis or fundamental value
interpretation, an unabashed, extraconstitutional embracing of the view
that the Supreme Court is a legitimate articulator of desirable moral
values. I personally doubt that even the Warren Court would have fol-
lowed through on all of the implications of its "new" equal protection
dicta. The Burger Court, though not immune to infusing values of
questionable constitutional legitimacy into the basic document, as it
demonstrated in Roe v. Wade,5 has made it unmistakably clear, as it
did in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,6 that it
will not join the campaign to read welfare rights into equal protection.
That judicial reluctance has both substantive and remedial aspects.
When courts try to resolve the polycentric issues of allocating limited
public funds and compel the political institutions to implement the ju-
dicial choices, there is not only doubt about the legitimacy of the ven-
ture, but also related doubt about the obvious problems of institutional
competence to succeed in the enterprise.
The welfare rights field is unusual in raising questions both of sub-
stantive legitimacy and remedial competence. I think they are often
separable questions, and I think it is useful to keep them as separate as
possible. Like Archibald Cox, I have concerns about both sets of
problems-those of legitimacy and rights and those of competence and
remedies. But in my view, as I will elaborate below, the legitimacy-
rights problem is a deeper and more serious one than is the compe-
tence-remedies problem.
4. Michelman, Wefare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659.
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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II.
Before elaborating on that conclusion, let me turn from the issue of
important distinctions to that of the historical roots of the new, reme-
dial, administrative, quasi-legislative role of the federal courts. Profes-
sor Cox noted the experience with Brown v. Board of Education7 as one
important turning point toward the adventurous new role of federal
courts. In an earlier lecture in this series, Professor Philip Kurland
used the refrain, "Brown v. Board of Education was the beginning.
'
"
8
I agree, but I would state the relevance of Brown somewhat differ-
ently. I see its importance as even greater than does Professor Cox. I
think that the process beginning with Brown HJ,9 the 1955 implementa-
tion decree of the Supreme Court, was the watershed, not just a con-
tributing cause. And I differ from Professor Kurland in his portrayal of
the decree and the thinking that went into it. Brown II was a water-
shed in a different sense than he described.
As I have noted, Brown I, the ruling on the merits, was a legitimate
one, but I think the opinion was flawed, though I would not use terms
as strong as those invoked by Professor Kurland. Nor would I agree
with his ascription of the reasons for the flaws. I think him wrong in
claiming that "the opinion was the result of desperate negotiations
aimed at assuring unanimity rather than clarity"'" and was a "commit-
tee effort" bearing the "stigmata of compromise."" Rather, I believe
that the opinion was the product of a unanimous, well-meaning, but
questionable strategic judgment to produce a document that could be
printed in full in the newspapers and could serve as an immediate force
of public persuasion. Such an opinion understandably deemphasized
traditional legal argumentation. And the failure of the Brown I opin-
ion as a public document suggests that the Court acts most wisely as
well as most legitimately when it remembers that its basic mission is to
be a court of law justifying its results in terms of the law.
But for the problem of changing institutional roles before us today,
Brown II, the "with all deliberate speed" decree of 1955, not Brown I,
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. Kurland, "Brown v. Board of Education was the Beginning, " The School Desegregation
Cases in the United States Supreme Court.- 1954-1979, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 309 quoting A. BICKEL,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 7 (1970).
9. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
10. Kurland, supra note 8, at 317.
11. Id.
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must be the central concern. Professor Kurland describes Brown II as
the root cause of all our modern problems of remedial competence. He
sees Brown I1 as a conscious, deliberate, willful act by the Court to
thrust federal judges into the managerial, administrative, quasi-legisla-
tive role. 2 In Kurland's view, the Court should simply have said "de-
segregate forthwith" and let it go at that. In my view, Kurland's
version of Brown II is a historical Monday morning quarterbacking.
In this instance, I can speak as someone in the same position Kur-
land ascribed to Professor Bickel with regard to Brown I-someone
there "at the creation."' 3 I was there when Brown II was before the
Court; I was clerking for Chief Justice Warren. Professor Kurland's
proposed disposition was not viewed as a feasible alternative by anyone
at the time. No one on the Court, indeed no one among counsel, really
thought that a "forthwith" decree would achieve implementation. All
recognized that such a decree would generate very serious problems
over the authority of the Supreme Court. A "forthwith" decree might
well have produced the desired results in the District of Columbia and
in the border states, Delaware and Kansas. But there were also com-
panion cases from Prince Edward County, Virginia, and Clarendon
County, South Carolina. Resistance and delay there were expectable.
And whatever the perspectives of history, in the spring of 1955 it was
not easy to contemplate the consequences for the credibility and
strength of the Supreme Court if, a year after a "forthwith" decree,
inaction prevailed in South Carolina, Virginia, and elsewhere. And
even a "forthwith" decree would surely have left very serious problems
of implementation for the beleaguered federal judges in the South.
The only practical alternatives before the Court, then, were to issue
an extremely detailed implementation decree, or to do what the Court
did-hand down a more general decree to remand the cases to the
lower courts, insisting that there be "a prompt and reasonable start" in
the process of desegregation. That "prompt and reasonable start" pro-
vision, I remind you, was in the decree, and was intended to be a com-
mand as clear as the more widely publicized and attacked direction
that, once that prompt start was made, completion of the process was to
proceed "with all deliberate speed."
But my more basic dispute with Professor Kurland's depiction of the
12. See id. at 322.
13. Id. at 314.
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history of Brown 11 is with his suggestion that the Supreme Court de-
liberately and consciously chose and encouraged the detailed adminis-
trative, managerial role ultimately assumed by lower federal courts in
the decades of desegregation litigation that followed Brown 11. That is
simply not so. What the Court-perhaps naively and innocently-
hoped for in 1955 was that which it described in the decree: that the
initiative should be with school administrators and political officials to
present plans for desegregation, with lower courts remaining in a rela-
tively passive, traditional posture. The Court hoped that there would
be speedy desegregation in the District of Columbia and the border
states, that the executive and legislative branches of the national gov-
ernment would ultimately lend a hand, and that, in response to those
stimuli, the deep South would ultimately set forth on the desegrega-
tion-initiating road.
Those hopes proved false, we know. The defendants and their politi-
cal supporters in many communities did not come forth with desegre-
gation plans. Confronted with foot-dragging, inaction, and resistance,
the federal courts were increasingly pushed into taking the initiative
and slowly became administrators, managers, and supervisors. But we
would be forgetting history if we forgot that this was initially an un-
welcomed role, thrust upon the lower federal courts and not seized by
them-thrust upon them by local inaction and resistance, and inaction
by the political branches of the national government as well. Contrary
to Professor Kurland's version, it was not the desire or anticipation or
conscious will of the Supreme Court in Brown II that produced those
developments.
But, of course, those developments took place. And in my view they
are of central importance to our current notions of remedial judicial
competence and especially to the courts' own notions of what they are
capable of doing. The judicial desegregation process has been much
criticized, yet it accomplished a lot. It did succeed, albeit slowly, in
implementing the Brown I condemnation of de jure public school seg-
regation. To me, the watershed importance of the aftermath of Brown
H lies precisely there: self-doubting judges were pushed into unaccus-
tomed managerial roles by southern recalcitrance; but, to a considera-
ble degree, the new judicial-administrative role worked, and that was
the most critical fact of all. The successes of the lower federal courts
overcame preexisting institutional doubts about competence. That suc-
cess produced, above all, a psychological shift, if one can speak of the
Number 3]
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psychology of institutions. The successful assumption of a new mana-
gerial role bred judicial self-confidence. More because of the aftermath
of Brown II than of anything else I can think of, judges changed their
minds about what judges are capable of doing. New tasks thrust upon
judges and reluctantly assumed by them proved capable, to a surprising
degree, of being carried out.
Given my view that Brown I was a legitimate decision on the merits,
I find no reason to quarrel with the courts' unavoidable assumption of
new tasks, which followed in the aftermath of Brown II. I am naive
enough to think that a court should not shrink from announcing legiti-
mate constitutional rights simply because of remedial concerns. Profes-
sor Cox referred in passing to John Marshall and Worcester v.
Georgia, 4 the 1832 case that rejected Georgia's claim of authority over
Indian lands and held the imprisonment of two missionaries illegal.
That decision engendered the most threatening consequences for the
Marshall Court, yet I think it represents the Marshall Court's noblest
hour. When Worcester was decided in the spring of 1832, John Mar-
shall and his colleagues knew that Andrew Jackson's White House and
a large part of Congress and a large part of Georgia were ready to defy
the Court. When John Marshall and his fellow justices voted in that
case, they genuinely believed that the decision might well mean the end
of effective Court authority. But they also thought that it was legally
right, and so it was. And, unflinchingly, they did their duty: they de-
cided the case on the merits, even though the immediate prospects were
anxiety-producing, even though the survival of the Court was truly at
stake. I think theirs was the proper judicial stance. If a decision is right
on the merits, it should be handed down, despite fears about the conse-
quences.
For me, then, concern about the expanding role of the courts does
not stem from the aftermath of Brown II and the story of school deseg-
regation. The concern arises from some of the collateral consequences
of the new tasks judges undertook after Brown I. The problem arises
from the new self-confidence generated among some judges as a result
of the desegregation experience. The problem arises primarily, I think,
when judges, armed with the new self-confidence generated by the
fairly successful handling of the novel remedial problems of Brown,
transfer that self-confidence to the quite different sphere of creating
14. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 536 (1832).
[Vol. 1979:817
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss3/12
COMMENTARY
new substantive rights of highly questionable legitimacy. In short, re-
medial ventures in the cause of enforcing clear-cut, legitimate rights
seem to me clearly warranted. Substantive ventures in creating new
rights, based on the confidence generated by the success of new reme-
dies, seem to me all wrong. And that, in one sense, illustrates my ear-
lier emphasis on the distinction between, and interrelationship of, the
rights-legitimacy problem and the remedies-competence one.
Reynolds v. Sims,'5 the reapportionment decision, illustrates the ex-
cessive readiness to transmute confidence about remedies into adven-
tures regarding rights. The ultimate justification for the Reynolds
ruling is hard, if not impossible, to set forth in constitutionally legiti-
mate terms. It rests, rather, on the view that courts are authorized to
step in when injustices exist and other institutions fail to act. That is a
dangerous-and I think illegitimate-prescription for judicial action.
Yet it is a prescription I read Professor Cox as endorsing, so long as the
case is a sufficiently pressing one.
If that prescription is ever legitimate, Reynolds v. Sims was surely an
appropriate case for it. Malapportionment in state legislatures really
did create severe structural obstacles to corrective action by the politi-
cal branches. But the danger of that prescription lies not only in its
basic illegitimacy, but also in the tendency to invoke it too readily in
less pressing circumstances. I have heard decisions in far less urgent
circumstances defended in very similar terms. And a good many
Supreme Court Justices believe that they are vested with the power to
act on those "last resort" grounds. For example, some seek to defend
the abortion decisions on similar bases. Yet the political process was
not truly at a standstill with respect to abortion at the time Roe v.
Wade16 came down. I have heard similar arguments in defense of
Jones v. Alfred. Mayer Company,'7 the expansive reading of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 as a housing discrimination law, even though Con-
gress had adopted the Fair Housing Act of 1968 shortly before the
Court's decision. And I could multiply my examples. To assert that
the Court is a "last resort" organ to correct injustices that are not ade-
quately addressed by the political branches seems to me to endorse a
view of the Justices perilously close to the "bevy of Platonic Guardi-
ans" rejected by Learned Hand.
15. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. 389 U.S. 968 (1967).
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And so the chief perceptions I derive from this brief historical glance
are twofold: the aftermath of Brown If was the central watershed with
respect to the new managerial, administrative, remedial role of federal
courts; but Reynolds v. Sims was the watershed for judicial creation of
new constitutional rights on the basis of perceived social needs, without
much regard for constitutional legitimacy.
III.
Turning from these reflections on distinctions and roots to some
guesses about the future, I share Professor Cox's concern about the ca-
pacity of the federal courts to serve as supervisors of large-scale institu-
tional reform. But I do not share the widely voiced assumption that an
ever expanding role of the courts in the creation of rights and the elab-
oration of remedies is probable or inevitable. Instead, I think we may
be near the crest. I may once again be naive and overoptimistic, but I
see-and I am glad to see-a range of signs of mounting doubt and
skepticism.
I would especially emphasize the mounting doubts among lower
court judges and scholars; and I deliberately put less emphasis on the
views of the Supreme Court. True, today's Supreme Court is more re-
luctant to endorse wide-ranging managerial remedies than that of ten
years ago, but that may not hold true when the composition of that
tribunal changes, and the Burger Court's remedial skepticism seems
less important, in any event, than its readiness to roam freely in the
realm of values of questionable legitimacy. With respect to concern for
legitimate constitutional interpretation, for example, I see little to
choose between Roosevelt-appointee William 0. Douglas and Nixon-
appointee Harry A. Blackmun.
I find far more significant the signs of changing attitudes among
frontline judges and among scholars. The trial judge faced with super-
visory responsibilities has more reason for self-confidence today than
he did a generation ago. But that frontline judge's experience in mana-
gerial tasks in recent years has also given the judge more reason to be
aware of the complexities and limits of the process. Let me cite just one
example. A recent issue of the Columbia Law Review has a graphic
piece by Curtis Berger, a Columbia law professor, on his experiences as
a master appointed by federal judge Jack Weinstein in a Brooklyn
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school desegregation case. 8 Now, my former colleague Weinstein is
one of the most daring of federal district judges. But, when confronted
with master Berger's proposals for the drastic promotion of institu-
tional reform, he drew back. Even the interventionist Weinstein knew
from his own past experience and that of fellow judges that there were
indeed real institutional limits to judicial competence and effectiveness.
And Weinstein's mounting doubts, I assure you, are by no means
unique.
I find even more encouraging the recent developments in constitu-
tional scholarship. As I said, the basic problem for me lies less in the
area of remedies than in the sphere of rights. Remedial daring is war-
ranted when there is a clear violation of a legitimate constitutional
right. The central difficulty comes from the assertion of rights of ques-
tionable legitimacy. And it is precisely with regard to that rights-legiti-
macy phase of the problem that the changing quality of scholarly
commentary is most encouraging.
That observation does not sit well with many critics of the expanding
role of the courts. I repeatedly hear it said that the academics are un-
critical about the Court, encourage the courts into ever more daring
ventures, and are themselves a central source of the problem rather
than contributors to solutions. That is not the way I see it.
Contrast, if you will, the academic commentaries of the Warren
years with those of today. Most academics agreed with the Warren
Court results. Many harbored private doubts about constitutional le-
gitimacy, but few dared speak out. I know a fair number who sup-
pressed their concerns for fear of giving aid and comfort to the enemy.
My former colleague Herbert Wechsler and my former employer
Learned Hand were among the few who dared criticize, despite the
knowledge that their thoughtful words would soon be placed into the
Congressional Record by the thoughtless political critics of the Court.
Today, criticism is far more widespread. The motivation is not always
the highest. To some extent the habit of criticism has been revived
because a good many academics do not like the results sought by the
Nixon appointees. Yet, whatever the motives, criticism is once again in
fashion.
Far more important than the result-oriented critics are those aca-
18. Berger, A'a, From the Court House and Into the Field- The Odyssey of a Special Master,
78 COLUM. L. REv. 707 (1978).
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demics who worry seriously about the legitimacy of newly created con-
stitutional rights. Perhaps I am being unduly parochial and academic
as well as naive, but I am heartened by the extraordinary recent phe-
nomenon of more serious and extensive worry in the literature than in
any earlier period of my professional career. There is an outburst of
writing about legitimate modes of constitutional interpretation and
about limits on judicial subjectiveness and open-endedness. An un-
precedented number of constitutional law scholars are writing book-
length studies focusing ultimately on the central problem of legitimacy
I raised earlier. John Ely and Frank Michelman at Harvard, Paul Brest
and Tom Grey of my faculty-able scholars such as those-are worry-
ing more seriously than ever about the permissible content of constitu-
tional adjudications on the merits.
Now, I confess I don't agree with much of what I have seen of their
product-most of it is still in draft. Much of what they propose strikes
me as going beyond the bounds of legitimate constitutional interpreta-
tion. But I think the most important point is that they are seriously and
extensively worrying about those bounds.
If I am correct that the central problem of the expanding judicial role
arises primarily when courts assert rights of marginal legitimacy rather
than when they engage in remedial ventures at the margins of their
competence, the dramatically reviving interest in legitimacy must
surely be a welcome development. The fact that I disagree with some
of what Michelman or Grey offers seems to me less important than the
fact that they are articulating their reasons in a way that permits rea-
soned response and challenge. That is surely a far cry from the charac-
teristically impassioned advocacy and commentary of the 1960's. I
think there is good reason to hope that from reasoned debate about the
legitimacy of expanding constitutional rights will come a healthy skep-
ticism about unwise ventures.
Institutional self-doubt on the bench and skepticism off the bench-
those are my ultimate prescriptions and hopes. Doubt and skepticism,
moreover, may be the most appropriate note for ending a commentary
on Archibald Cox's article. One of our ties is our shared admiration for
our former employer, Learned Hand. Institutional self-doubt and
scholarly skepticism are central legacies of Hand's approach to the ju-
dicial process. I hope that we have demonstrated that it is a legacy not
forgotten by at least two of his former law clerks.
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